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Improved allocations, or outcomes, can be achieved only through improvements in the institutions that generate them, and improvements in such institutions, in turn, can be achieved only if their proper role in the whole structure of democratic
process is appreciated and understood. James M. Buchanan (1967) 
Introduction
Key to James Buchanan's thinking about federalism is his view about fiscal competition. It is the main characteristic that distinguishes his approach from the traditional theory of fiscal federalism still dominating public economics. In traditional public finance, the main question is how the optimal provision and financing of public goods and services in a polity with several tiers of government should look like. Such analysis leads to the conclusion as to which government level -federal (central), regional (state) or local -should adopt which tasks, and which tax should be allocated to which government level. The obtained allocation of responsibilities is determined by the nature of the goods and services provided, i.e., the degree of publicness or rivalness, the existence of regional externalities of public goods or taxes, the extent of fiscal externalities, economies of scale, the mobility of individuals and capital or the norms underlying fiscal redistribution (Wilson 1999 ).
Buchanan, in contrast, considered fiscal competition as a means to correct government failures, hence as a possibility to restrict Leviathan governments. If individuals can move freely between jurisdictions, they will choose their residence in places in which they maximize their utility not only regarding private goods, but also regarding the fiscal residuum of public goods and the taxes paid to finance them. By voting with their feet, they reveal their preferences for public goods, exert pressure to provide them at least cost and are thus able to realize an optimal bundle of public goods and taxes (Tiebout 1956 ). This process leads to a detection of inefficiencies in the provision of public services and allows governments to adjust. The possibility of individuals (or of capital) to exit a jurisdiction, therefore, also restrains the extent to which a government can tax its citizens excessively. It reduces the ability of governments and bureaucracies to exploit citizens.
In March 1998, James Buchanan there is a chance to leave, this necessarily imposes discipline on those who would exploit you through a political structure or a bureaucratic structure." (Buchanan and Musgrave 1998, p. 179) .
In this quote, it becomes obvious that Buchanan does not even think in narrow terms of market or government failure. Rather, he takes federalism as an institution which protects liberty. It is a freedom enhancing institution, an "ideal political order" (Buchanan 1995) , that ensures individual sovereignty (Buchanan 1995 (Buchanan /1996 . He thus places, more than (almost)
any other economist, federalism in the class of constitutional safeguards that are promoting free societies. Weingast (1995) , who comes close to Buchanan's thinking in that regard, more narrowly speaks of market-preserving federalism. Buchanan's understanding of federalism resembles Hayek's (1939) Buchanan and Tullock (1962) analyze bicameral legislature in chapter 16 of the Calculus of Consent underlining the higher decision-making costs and the lower expected external costs of collective action involved by bicameralism. Their analysis also implies that minority rights may be better protected in bicameral than unicameral legislatures. As Mueller (1996) demonstrates, these functions of bicameralism only partially cover the issues discussed in public choice and constitutional economics since the Calculus. For example, Tsebelis (1995 Tsebelis ( , 2002a Tsebelis ( , 2002b ) much more strongly emphasizes the possibilities bicameralism offers to veto players in a polity to obstruct any political changes thus leading to a status quo bias in legislative decision-making. As James Buchanan's analysis of bicameralism as a feature of federalism has not been that influential in subsequent analyses, it is left out from the critical appraisal of his works on federalism offered in this paper.
Also, Buchanan and Congleton's (1998) re-interpretation of federalism in the context of a generality norm is not further considered. They argue that federalism allows for the provision of uniform public services as a consequence of inter-jurisdictional competition and is thus "the best real laboratory of the appeal of the generality principle" (p. 195). The authors emphasize an important characteristic of federalism, i.e., the provision of public services to citizens according to their preferences after they have sorted into different jurisdictions in a competitive process (Feld 2000, Feld and Kirchgässner 2001) , by considering it as a means to avoid discriminatory political decisions. In that sense it is a re-statement of the Tiebout mechanism from a different perspective.
Overall, it takes Buchanan four decades to arrive at his thinking about federalism that is distinct from the traditional economic theory of federalism. His first papers on federalism, dating from 1950 to 1972, are concerned with traditional problems of fiscal federalism. I will discuss them in Section 2 and put them into the perspective of traditional fiscal federalism theory. Buchanan (1977, 1980) derived the idea of fiscal federalism as a restraint on Leviathan governments. This analysis marks the shift towards Buchanan's distinguished thinking about federalism. The literature on fiscal competition and Leviathan is surveyed in Section 3. Buchanan's broader constitutional and philosophical interpretation of fiscal federalism is outlined in Section 4. Concluding remarks follow in Section 5.
Roots in Traditional Fiscal Federalism Thinking
Buchanan's early analyses of federalism cope with traditional research questions. First, Buchanan (1950) considers fiscal equity as the basis for systems of fiscal equalization between jurisdictions in a federation. Second, Buchanan and Wagner (1970) and Buchanan and Goetz (1972) analyze possible inefficiencies emerging in a system of competitive federalism. These papers belong to the traditional theory of federalism as Buchanan and his co-authors are concerned with pure equity or efficiency issues. Public Choice or Constitutional Economics do not play much of a role here.
In " Federalism and Fiscal Equity", Buchanan (1950) applies the equity principle, i.e., in the sense of "equal treatment of equals" or "equal treatment for persons dissimilar in no relevant respect" (Buchanan 1950, p. 7) in order to obtain a guideline for fiscal redistribution between jurisdictions. 1 This fiscal norm implies that fiscal transfers between regions, i.e., a horizontal fiscal equalization system or vertical systems with a horizontally equalizing effect, should not aim at revenue capacity and thus redistribute tax revenue from the rich to the poor regions.
Rather, the "fiscal residuum", as Buchanan (1950, p. 9) The papers by Buchanan and Wagner (1970) and Buchanan and Goetz (1972) are questioning the efficiency argument in Tiebout's (1956) analysis regarding fiscal competition. Voting by feet allows citizens to shop around in different jurisdictions finding out which bundle of public goods and tax prices comes closest to their preferences. This competitive federalism finally leads to an efficient provision of public services at least cost according to the preferences of citizens. Buchanan and Wagner (1970) argue that this does not hold for impure public goods when congestion occurs. Buchanan and Goetz (1972) generalize this argument to pure public goods by considering a whole range of different public good types. Fiscal externalities are the main reason leading to inefficiencies. 3 Individuals emigrating from one jurisdiction induce a higher tax price per capita on the people remaining there, while they reduce the tax burden of the taxpayers in the jurisdiction to which they immigrate.
Whereas the nature of public goods as compared to private goods is emphasized in these papers, they concentrate on the non-excludability characteristics of public goods. The fiscal externality literature in fiscal competition models meanwhile emphasizes the non-rivalness characteristic (Wilson 1999) . Focusing on non-excludability you are tempted to ask what can we do to exclude people from immigrating to a polity. Focusing on non-rivalness, it becomes clear that fiscal competition remains marginally efficient, but that infra-marginally the average cost of providing public goods cannot be imposed on the mobile factors (Sinn 2003) .
The degree of mobility of different taxpayers is thus more important and the focus is on the question as to what extent the relatively immobile factor can bear the additional tax burden.
Fiscal Competition as a Constraint on Leviathan
Buchanan moves away from traditional fiscal federalism theory in "The Power to Tax" written jointly with Geoff Brennan and published in 1980. Government and bureaucracies are considered here as revenue-maximizing Leviathans, more exactly, as maximizing the revenue surplus given the costs of public goods provided. As the government has a coercive monopoly, it can generate the revenue that is necessary to finance the public goods and services which citizens demand. But like a monopolist, the government thus also has the ability to charge higher tax prices in order to maximize its gains. This leads to excessive taxation which is difficult to avoid in the political process even if citizens are generally aware of this mechanism.
A tax constitution for a Leviathan government (Brennan and Buchanan 1977) should impose particular constraints on such behavior. Formal fiscal restraints, like tax limits or balanced budget requirements, are possibilities to impose such restrictions on Leviathan behavior.
Similarly and as a direct substitute to formal fiscal restraints, competitive federalism and a high openness of economies put a restraint on Leviathan governments. If political voice is too weak to avoid excessive taxation, the exit option allows taxpayers for finding jurisdictions in which they get the same utility from the public goods provided for lower tax prices. This holds for individuals as worker and as capital owners, but also for firms. Any possibility to avoid excessive taxation in the tax competition game between jurisdictions offers a potential to correct government failures: (Brennan and Buchanan 1980, p. 214) .
Given these restrictions on the exploitative ability of governments, it should be expected that government size is reduced in a system of competitive governments. This could be called the competition hypothesis (Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger 2010) or the Leviathan hypothesis (Liberati and Sacchi 2013) . Similarly, the decentralization hypothesis predicts a correction of government size: "Total government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized." (Brennan and Buchanan 1980, p. 216) . While Brennan and Buchanan arrive at this conclusion from their analysis of inter-jurisdictional competition between Leviathan governments, Oates (1972) obtains that hypothesized outcome as the result of greater efficiency of the public sector because public good provision is closer to citizen preferences.
It could thus be interpreted as distinct from the competition hypothesis.
A more intensive competition between jurisdictions might result from a higher number of jurisdictions. The more jurisdictions exist, the less costly is emigration and thus the more strongly restricted is the government's ability for excessive taxation: "the potential for fiscal
exploitation varies inversely with the number of competing governmental units in the inclusive
territory" (Brennan and Buchanan 1980, p. 211) . But a higher number of jurisdictions also reduces the potential for collusion among jurisdictions: "the costs of organizing and enforcing collusive agreements increase disproportionately as the number of competitors increases" (Brennan and Buchanan 1980, p. 211) . Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2010) have called this the fragmentation hypothesis as a corollary to the competition hypothesis and attribute the idea of collusion to the grant system.
The Leviathan approach indeed sheds a different light on grants or fiscal equalization systems. Any of these systems allows for restrictions on fiscal competition. In the case of revenue sharing systems the responsibilities for taxation are not sufficiently clearly allocated such that taxpayers cannot properly compare tax prices and public goods when choosing their place of residence. A fiscal equalization system in which regions agree on a common mechanism to (re-)distribute funds works like a collusive mechanism in which competition is restrained or even excluded. The primary purpose of federalism, namely creating competition between jurisdictions, is thus subverted. The central government as the administrator of revenue sharing, joint taxation or fiscal equalization systems serves as "the monitor of a cartel among lower levels of government" (Brennan and Buchanan 1980, p. 213) . The collusion hypothesis follows more properly from a situation in which the cartel is enforced by a central authority through the grants system (Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger 2010) .
Adding to the Leviathan model, James Buchanan has extended his ideas about the working of exit possibilities in a joint paper with Roger Faith (1987) arguing that the threat of secession limits the possibilities of a dominating or ruling political coalition to exploit other groups and extract fiscal surplus. In contrast to the Leviathan model, in the secession case, groups instead of individuals emigrate and form their own polity. In such cases, fiscal surplus is reduced such that the avoidance of secession is in the interest of the ruling coalition. Potential secession provides incentives for the ruling coalition to include additional societal groups that have a relatively higher ability to secede. The groups favored may be the rich and those with higher human capital.
The Leviathan model has induced criticism by several authors. Edwards and Keen (1996) interpret the choice set for systems of interjurisdictional competition as a trade-off between the inefficiencies derived from traditional welfare-theoretic models of fiscal federalism and the restraints that competition imposes on excessive taxation. Apolte (2001) Given the rich set of empirically testable hypotheses, it is no surprise that the Leviathan model has triggered a large number of empirical studies which analyze whether decentralization reduces the size of government (see Table 1 ). Across time, the studies have increasingly become more precise as to what they actually test. While the first generation, mainly tested whether a measure of decentralization is negatively correlated with government size, the second generation has more closely looked at the impact of fiscal competition on government size and thus has aimed at testing the Leviathan hypothesis more directly. The dividing line between first and second generation studies cannot be attributed to a particular year. For example, the studies by Cantarero and Perez (2012) or by Kwon (2013) use traditional decentralization measures. Their improvement compared to previous studies is the inclusion of a broader set of control variables. Baskaran (2011) analyzes the differential effects of decentralization on government size in different ideological environments and uses the traditional decentralization measures. Source: Kirchgässner (2002b), Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2003) and own collection of recent literature.
Actually, the first empirical study was published before Buchanan (1980). Oates (1972) analyzes for a sample of 57 countries whether decentralization is associated with lower government revenue and finds no support. Shortly after the publication of The Power to Tax, DiLorenzo (1983) , Solano (1983) and again Oates (1985) reported mixed evidence for a decreasing effect of decentralization on government size, although the evidence looks a bit better for spending than for revenue. Since then, a higher number of papers finds support for a restrictive effect of decentralization on government size, while the results on fragmentation have remained mixed throughout the whole literature. Of the first generation studies, 16 papers provided evidence supporting the Leviathan hypothesis compared to 8 studies reporting no support. 4 Regarding fragmentation, there are four studies in Table 1 overall with no and two studies with significant effects. Similarly contradictory are the two studies using a federalism dummy.
There are several problems with the first generation empirical studies. Mainly using a decentralization measure, they do not properly measure fiscal competition and thus do not exactly test the Leviathan hypothesis. As Rodden (2002 Rodden ( , 2003 or Blume and Voigt (2011) point out, decentralization of spending or revenue could be high without shifting actual When more precise measures are used in the first generation studies, e.g., regarding the fragmentation hypothesis, the results are rather disappointing. This does not hold in the second generation studies, however, in which tax competition is more directly measured. Rodden (2003) considers the share of own-source, instead of overall subnational revenue, from total revenue as an indicator of decentralization that comes closer to capturing fiscal competition and finds support for its restrictive effect on government spending for 59 4 The first generation studies include all papers until 2002, but also the papers by Baskaran (2011), Cantarero and Perez (2012) and Kwon (2013) Voigt and Blume (2010) apply a factor analysis to study the impact of federalism on a large number of dependent variables including government spending. The factor capturing revenue autonomy does however not indicate the extent of fiscal competition between jurisdictions and could therefore not be used to test the Leviathan hypothesis. I consider this study to belong neither to the first nor the second generation studies.
countries between 1978 and 1997. Fiva (2006) In three recent studies, the extent of tax competition is directly measured such that its impact of government size can be better identified. Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2010) analyze the impact of decentralized taxation on the size of government for 26 Swiss cantons between 1980 and 1998. They distinguish different transmission channels: Fiscal competition is measured by the weighted average of the other cantons' income tax rates in the highest income tax bracket (weight: inverse of distance), fragmentation by the number of communes in a canton, tax exporting by the number of tourist days per canton, and grants as the real net transfer payments from the central to the cantonal governments. In addition, the typical decentralization measure is used and instrumented. Studying the whole tax structure, they find a robust and significant negative effect of tax competition on government revenue while decentralization still has a significant additional effect.
Taking into account spatial interdependencies, Crowley and Sobel (2011) compare actual property tax rates with revenue-maximizing tax rates using panel data for Pennsylvanian local jurisdictions. They find that decentralization induces stronger interjurisdictional competition and lower tax rates, while collusion between school districts is accompanied by higher interdependence, but also higher tax rates. Liberati and Sacchi (2013) analyze the particular impact of tax separation schemes in the sense that subfederal jurisdictions use particular tax sources exclusively. They find that such tax decentralization organized on tax bases restricts government size in OECD countries. In a study using panel cointegration techniques and panel error correction models, Ashworth, Galli and Padovano (2013) report that a decentralization of own-source revenue using the OECD-Stegarescu measure leads to a longterm fall in the size of governments, while grants have the opposite effect. Finally, Feld and Schnellenbach (2014) use the OECD-Stegarescu measure for a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998 reporting a restrictive impact of tax decentralization on the ability of governments to redistribute income.
Overall, these results, showing that fiscal competition between jurisdictions reduces government size, are rather in favor of than against Brennan and Buchanan's (1980) Leviathan hypothesis. Of the second generation studies, two are inconclusive and seven are in favor of the Leviathan hypothesis. The main difference between Buchanan's thinking and traditional fiscal federalism analyses, i.e., the role of interjurisdictional competition, has thus turned to have some explanatory power for the fiscal behavior of governments and bureaucracies.
Federalism as an Ideal Political Order
Given Buchanan's distinct perspective on federalism, it seems natural that the next step consists in embedding this thinking in Constitutional Economics. In Buchanan (1995) , he characterizes federalism as an ideal political order. In the same year, Buchanan (1995 Buchanan ( /96, 1996 extends this view to considering federalism as a protector of individual sovereignty and economic freedom. These analyses correspond nicely with his remarks on European integration (Buchanan 1990 , 1997 , Buchanan and Lee 1994 .
According to Buchanan (1995/96, p. 159 things. In addition to pure fiscal competition, yardstick competition is facilitated in federations (Salmon 1987, Besley and Case 1995) . Buchanan (1995 Buchanan ( /1996 acknowledges this idea and illustrates it with the experience in Eastern Europe: Without the possibility of migration, the good example of West European states finally triggered political change.
While Buchanan (1995) stresses the market analogue of federalism like Weingast (1995) , Besley and Coate (2003) extend the analysis along the vertical structure of federalism pretty much in the spirit of Buchanan. Even if the federal government is not of the Leviathan type and does not have information problems regarding the regional distribution of preferences for public goods, a political economy problem emerges that can be solved by a decentralized provision of public goods. This is the case because the fiscal commons problem is more severe, the more centralized provision and financing of public goods are. Different groups address their demand for public services to each budget. Spending programs are targeted to the groups that provide the most decisive support for representatives. The broader the costs of targeted spending can be spread, the stronger the common pool problem becomes. At the central level, this is facilitated by log-rolling and pork-barrel politics. In the case of decentralized provision and financing at the regional (state) or local levels, log-rolling and pork-barrel politics become more difficult. The costs of financing public services are less dispersed at the subcentral than at the central level as long as fiscal responsibilities are not blurred by grants or fiscal equalization systems.
The arguments of Besley and Coate (2003) correspond to Buchanan's (1995/96) thoughts about voter's advantage of decentralized provision and financing of public goods. As one vote influences election outcomes with a higher probability in small than in large jurisdictions, voters can more easily exert political control. The smallness of a polity facilitates discussion processes which are, as argued by Feld and Kirchgässner (2000) in the case of direct democracy, important for citizens to question their own position on political issues with respect to its generalizability. Federalism could thus improve citizens' public spiritedness. Federalism facilitates the transcendence of one's own narrow self-interest to the consideration of others' interests in the community, but it does not overcharge individual moral capacity by demanding individuals to care for others in the whole country to the same extent.
This procedural perspective on federalism allows for additional observations on asymmetric federalism. Whereas traditional public finance underlines the difficulties posed by asymmetries in interjurisdictional competition (Bucovetsky 1991 , Wilson 1991 , either because of different population sizes, factor endowments, (natural) resources or constitutional provisions, Buchanan (1996) considers such asymmetries as sustainable as long as citizens' loyalties are sufficiently localized. In this spirit, Congleton (2006) has a closer look into the circumstances under which asymmetric federalism might emerge.
Concluding Remarks
As demonstrated in this paper, James Buchanan's thinking about federalism went through three stages. From the 1950s to the beginning of the 1970s, his analyses were well embedded in the traditional fiscal federalism literature and concerned with equity and efficiency outcomes. In the Leviathan approach starting from the mid-seventies, he considered competition between jurisdictions as a means to restrict Leviathan governments and a substitute to formal fiscal constraints. Federalism, decentralization, interjurisdictional competition offer the possibility to correct government failures as an outcome of the political process. In his interpretation of federalism as an ideal political order, Buchanan binds these perspectives together and adds a procedural view: Federalism enables citizens to exert political control, it raises their interest in politics because one vote has more influence, and it facilitates to act morally within their moral capacity.
Buchanan's view on federalism across time led to the emergence of the so called second generation theory of fiscal federalism (Oates 2005) and opened a procedural perspective. The obvious application of this approach for Buchanan himself appeared to be European integration (Buchanan 1990 , 1997 , Buchanan and Lee 1994 (Buchanan 2001, p. 241) .
Nevertheless, this quote highlights the differences between Buchanan's view and the view of traditional public finance on federalism: Even if federalism was not efficient in the narrow allocative sense, a federal structure would be desirable as a means of controlling and checking the central government authority (Buchanan and Musgrave 1998, p. 178 
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